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SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN MARYLAND*
C. CHRISTOPHER BROWN**
INTRODUCTION
As court congestion and judicial backlogs demand greater
attention from the bench and bar, summary procedures have become
increasingly popular for the speedy resolution of disputes. In the last
thirty years or so, one such procedure, the motion for summary
judgment, has emerged as one of the foremost means of streamlining
the civil adjudicatory process. The standard formulation of the
summary judgment procedure is simple. In Maryland under rule 610,
for example, any party to an action "may at any time make a motion
for summary judgment in his favor ... on the ground that there is
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that he is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law."' As straightforward as this test may
seem on the surface, it has been the source of great confusion to
members of both bench and bar. Professor Moore, for example, has
taken one and a half sizeable volumes to explain its workings in the
federal system,2 while Professors Wright and Miller have spent
nearly four hundred pages discussing this topic. 3
Summary judgment has also made a significant impact on
Maryland courts. In the last ten years, the Maryland Court of
Appeals and Court of Special Appeals have dealt with rule 610 issues
in no less than ninety reported opinions. These statistics suggest the
growing complexity and popularity of this summary procedure in the
civil justice system. Unfortunately, however, what began as a simple
and understandable procedural reform has evolved in many
situations into a trap for the unwary litigator. The Maryland Court
of Appeals' case law is replete with examples of the filing of
defective summary judgment motions,4 inadequate or ineffective
supporting affidavits,5 and unresponsive countering affidavits. 6
* @ Copyright 1979 by C. Christopher Brown. All rights reserved.
** B.A. 1963, Swarthmore College; M.A. 1965, University of Delaware; J.D. 1968,
Georgetown University; Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland.
1. MD. R.P. 610(a)(1).
2. See 6 & 6 pt. 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.01 to .27 (2d ed. 1976).
3. 10 C. WRIGHT& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2711-2742
(1973).
4. E.g., Fletcher v. Flournoy, 198 Md. 53, 56-60, 81 A.2d 232, 233-35 (1951).
5. E.g., Ehrlich v. Board of Educ., 257 Md. 542, 546, 263 A.2d 853, 855-56 (1970);
White v. Friel, 210 Md. 274, 279-80, 123 A.2d 303, 305 (1956).
6. E.g., Foley v. County Comm'rs, 247 Md. 162, 175, 230 A.2d 298, 305 (1967);
Frush v. Brooks, 204 Md. 315, 321-22, 104 A.2d 624, 626 (1954).
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These and other transgressions by counsel have been caused, in
part, by the subtle complexities of a rule which at first blush seems
simplistic. Other pitfalls have been created by variations between
what the rule requires on its face and what the Court of Appeals has
mandated in practice.7 Whatever the causes, the entire benefit that
should be derived from a smoothly functioning summary judgment
procedure has yet to be realized fully in Maryland.
The objective of this Article is twofold. First, it is intended to
explore thoroughly the workings of Maryland's summary judgment
procedure and to report on the present status of the law. This
analysis should be helpful to the practitioner in resolving everyday
problems of litigation. Second, detailed reflection upon this first
inquiry leads the inquirer to pinpoint many of the flaws in our
present system and to suggest proposals for their reform. A number
of ambiguities and inconsistencies exist in the cases interpreting
rule 610. The implementation of modernizing amendments to the
rule and stricter adherence to the lines of cases that are in accord
with the fundamental purposes of summary judgment can help
restore order to the procedure and eliminate its present pitfalls.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Summary judgment came into being to satisfy the increasingly
recognized judicial need to provide a more expeditious and inexpen-
sive way to resolve disputes raising little factual controversy. This
procedure initially satisfied what was viewed as a plaintiff creditor's
need for prompt judicial relief for relatively clear-cut cases of
indebtedness. Although summary judgment procedures existed in
this country as early as 1769,8 they proved to be false starts and
gradually dropped from sight.9 Summary judgment procedures
nevertheless managed to gain a more permanent foothold with the
passage in England of The Summary Procedure on Bills of
Exchange Act10 in 1855. This provision was limited to a plaintiffs
7. See pp. 202-10 infra.
8. See Millar, Three American Ventures in Summary Civil Procedure, 38 YALE L.
J. 193, 195-204 (1928).
9. South Carolina, for example, employed a summary process from 1769 until
1870. Id. Kentucky's proceeding by petition and summons was in force from 1805 until
1851. Id. at 204-08. Several other states adopted summary forms similar to
Kentucky's summary procedure, but they were also short-lived solutions. Summary
forms existed in Alabama from 1820 to 1852, in Missouri from 1825 to 1849, in Illinois
from 1833 to 1874, in Arkansas from 1837 to 1868, in Iowa from 1839 to 1851, and in
Kansas from 1855 to 1859. Id. at 208-12. Virginia was the only state to retain the
summary motion which it had adopted in the mid-nineteenth century. Id. at 213-24.
10. 1855, 18 & 19 Vict., c. 67.
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liquidated claims on bills of exchange and promissory notes.
Parliament declared that the bona fide holders of these documents
"are often unjustly delayed and put to unnecessary Expense... by
reason of frivolous or fictitious Defenses to Actions thereon."" It
therefore enacted a more expedient remedy by which these relatively
uncomplicated claims, which readily lent themselves to simplified
procedures, could be adjudicated. Creditors could invoke the
summary procedure by specially endorsing their claims upon a writ
of summons.' 2 After the defendant entered an appearance before the
court in response to the specially endorsed writ, the plaintiff could
apply to the judge to enter a final judgment based on an affidavit
"'made by himself, or by any person who can swear positively to the
facts, verifying the cause of action and the amount claimed (if any),
and stating that in his belief there is no defense to the action."" 13
This application shifted the burden to the defendant to prove by
affidavit or personal testimony that he either had a good defense to
the charge or that such facts existed that would entitle him to
defend.14 Defendants filing such a personal affidavit could be
ordered by the judge to attend and to be examined on oath or to
produce any documents.'5 Once affidavits and any testimony had
been received, the court determined whether an actual defense to the
action had been made. If an adequate defense was not offered, the
defendant would be considered to have defaulted, and summary
judgment for the plaintiff could be granted.' 6
The historical predecessor to summary judgment in Maryland
was a procedure in equity known as a hearing on bill and answer.' 7
As Poe's treatise describes it:
11. Id. (preamble).
12. See Clark & Samenow, The Summary Judgment, 38 YALE L.J. 423, 424-28
(1929). The indorsement filed by the complainant or plaintiff had to be a signed
document that clearly established the connection between the defendant and the
plaintiffs claim. The indorsement also served to apprise the defendant of the
plaintiffs claim. Id. at 428.
13. Id. at 430 (quoting Order XIV, Rule 1(a), ANNUAL PRACTICE (1928)). While the
English rules at that time seemed to require that an affidavit at least accompany the
motion, the case law indicated that it could be filed after the summons had been
issued. Clark & Samenow, supra note 12, at 430.
14. Clark & Samenow, supra note 12, at 430.
15. Id. at 431.
16. Id. at 430.
17. See E. MILLER, EQUITY PROCEDURE §§ 255-257 (1897). For a discussion of this
equitable procedure and its application, see Warren v. Twilley, 10 Md. 39 (1856);
McKim v. Odom 3 B1. 407 (Md. Ch. 1828); Contee v. Dawson, 2 Bl. 264 (Md. Ch. 1826).
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Demurrers were not permitted to answers, and should the
plaintiff feel that the answer of the defendant was legally
insufficient he simply admitted [its] allegations . .. and upon
proof of the facts alleged in his bill of complaint submitted the
cause to the court on the legal issues or questions thus raised.'8
This procedure was greatly limited in scope. The hearing on bill and
answer rule was applicable only in cases heard in equity; it could be
invoked only by plaintiffs; 9 and there were many risks for the
unwary.20
It was not until 1858 that any summary proceeding in law was
introduced into Maryland procedure. Maryland's first procedure for
effecting "speedy judgments" was enacted by the legislature in 1858
and was applicable only to Baltimore City.2' Similar to the English
statute, this 1858 procedure applied only to actions for liquidated
amounts "for recovery of money due on any contract endorsed by
writing under the hand of the defendant. ' 22 In 1886 the legislature
repealed and reenacted the 1858 act, and it became known as the
Speedy Judgment Act of the Practice Act. 23 Most Maryland counties
adopted identical or similar acts to provide a quick means of
bringing to judgment valid uncontested claims in which the amount
in controversy was certain and liquidated. 24 These "speedy judg-
ment" acts not only offered "a short and expeditious method of
recovery" in situations in which they were invoked, but also "by
requiring disclosure under oath, as to the real amount or matter in
dispute or actual contest between the parties, [avoided] unnecessary
trouble and expense in the trial."25
18. 4 POE'S PLEADING and PRACTICE 1 (6th ed. H. Sachs 1975) [hereinafter cited as
POE'S PLEADING].
19. Somerville v. Marbury, 7 G. & J. 275, 280 (Md. 1835). See Aetna Indem. Co. v.
Baltimore, S. P. & C. Ry., 112 Md. 389, 394-95, 76 A. 251, 253 (1910); Contee v.
Dawson, 2 Bl. 264, 267 (Md. Ch. 1826); E. MILER, supra note 17, § 255. But see
Hollander v. Central Metal & Supply Co., 109 Md. 131, 150, 71 A. 442, 444 (1908).
20. See Nardo v. Favazza, 206 Md. 122, 126, 110 A.2d 676, 678 (1955); text
accompanying note 26 infra.
21. Ch. 323, 1858 Md. Laws 488. See Nardo v. Favazza, 206 Md. 122, 125, 110 A.2d
676, 678 (1955); Explanatory Notes of the Reporter on Rules of Procedure Recom-
mended in the Second Report, MD. ANN. CODE at 2107 (Cum. Supp. 1947) [hereinafter
cited as Explanatory Notes].
22. Ch. 323, § 7, 1858 Md. Laws 489.
23. Ch. 184, § 1, 1886 Md. Laws 307-09. The 1886 act still only applied to
Baltimore City. See generally Pittman, The Maryland Speedy Judgment Acts, 2 MD.
L. REv. 305 (1938); Explanatory Notes, supra note 21, at 2107-08.
24. See Pittman, supra note 23, at 305; Explanatory Notes, supra note 21, at 2108.
25. Gemmel v. Davis, 71 Md. 458, 464, 18 A. 955, 956 (1889) (commenting on
Baltimore City's Practice Act of 1886).
1978]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
The Maryland Court of Appeals later criticized the successors of
these acts, despite their broadened scope, stating that they
had a number of shortcomings including lack of uniformity in
the details of pleading and practice; technicalities that could be
interposed to defeat the right to summary relief; requirements of
unnecessary strictness for the form of affidavits; and the
possibility that a defendant could postpone judgment by filing a
demurrer or demand for particulars. It was also found that the
proceedings, because of their formal and technical character,
seldom achieved one of the important objectives of this
procedure, the narrowing of issues to those genuinely in dispute
to avoid unnecessary trouble and expense in the trial.26
In 1947 the Court of Appeals adopted what has become the present
summary judgment procedure in Maryland. 27 It was modeled
primarily after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which had been
enacted in 1938.28 The new Maryland rule, however, contained
"certain changes to adapt it to the existing Maryland procedural
system. ' ' 29 Unlike its predecessors, it was made applicable to both
law and equity and could be invoked at any stage of the proceedings
in all types of actions and by any party to the action.A0 To ferret out
26. Nardo v. Favazza, 206 Md. 122, 126, 110 A.2d 676, 678 (1955). See Explanatory
Notes, supra note 21, at 2107-09, reprinted in 4 POE'S PLEADING, supra note 18, at 2-4.
27. MD. GEN. R. PRAc. & P., IV. Summary Judgment, rules 1-4, MD. ANN. CODE
at 2044-45 (Cum. Supp. 1947). See Brown v. Suburban Cadillac, Inc., 260 Md. 251, 255
n.1, 272 A.2d 42, 44 n.1 (1971) (noted that 1947 rules of procedure do not differ in
any material respect from present Maryland summary judgment rule 610). To effect
the transition from the earlier summary judgment procedures, rule 610(a)(4)
specifically provides: "Cases formerly heard on bill and answer may be heard under
this Rule."
28. See Explanatory Notes, supra note 21, at 2113, reprinted in 4 POE'S PLEADING,
supra note 18, at 8.
29. Id.
30. See Explanatory Notes, supra note 21, at 2113-14, reprinted in 4 PoE's
PLEADING, supra note 18, at 8. Maryland did have a special form of summary remedy
which was set out in MD. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 24 (1939) and provided:
Any party to an action or suit at law, or in equity, may, at any stage
thereof, apply to the court for such order or judgment as he may, upon any
admission of fact in the pleadings or other written admissions in the case, be
entitled to without waiting for the determination of any other question
between the parties. Such application may be made by motion or petition so
soon as the right of the party applying to the relief claimed has appeared from
the pleadings or other written admissions in such action or suit, and the court
may, upon such application, give such relief, subject to such terms, if any, as
such court may think fit, and such order or judgment shall, with the
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any factual dispute, it relies primarily upon the filing of affidavits,
depositions, or other documentary evidence.
3 1
In some respects the Maryland rule updated its federal
counterpart. Federal rule 56, for example, had been interpreted "not
to allow partial summary judgments except where the only disputed
issue is the amount of damages. ' 32 The new Maryland rule, however,
specifically permitted such a partial adjudication,33 an improvement
that has also been incorporated into the federal rule.34 The current
rule governing summary judgment in Maryland trial courts is rule
610 which has been amended several times since its introduction in
1947. Although the adoption of this rule streamlined Maryland's
summary procedures, further modifications are necessary to enhance
its efficacy.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
A trial before a finder of fact is obviously unnecessary if no
genuine dispute as to any material fact exists between the parties. A
case in this posture, which would turn solely on an issue of law, may
be resolved by a motion for summary judgment under rule 610. This
device advances the speedy and efficient administration of justice by
eliminating a costly, time-consuming, and unnecessary trial and
permitting prompt resolution of the legal issues in the case. 35 The
proceedings relating thereto, form part of the record and be reviewable on
appeal from the final judgment or decree in such action or suit.
The statute was enacted in 1888, ch. 442, 1888 Md. Laws 720, but appears to have been
used sparingly, if at all; it has not been cited in any reported case. Because it requires
written admissions as the basis for judgment and Maryland had no adequate means
for obtaining such admissions until the adoption of the discovery rules in 1941, there
were probably few occasions for its use. Nevertheless, the statute is of great interest. It
represents an early recognition of the desirability of summary disposition of cases,
whether at law or in equity, when there is no genuine controversy as to the material
facts. In making admissions the only basis for summary relief, however, the statute
was too restrictive. The same procedure should be extended to any case in which it
can be shown that the material facts are not genuinely controverted in good faith.
Explanatory Notes, supra note 21, at 2110, reprinted in 4 POE'S PLEADING, supra note
18, at 4-5.
31. See Explanatory Notes, supra note 21, at 2114, reprinted in 4 POE'S PLEADING,
supra note 18, at 8
32. Id. at 2115, reprinted in 4 POE'S PLEADING, supra note 18, at 10.
33. MD. GEN. R. PRAc. & P., IV. Summary Judgment, rule 4(c), MD. ANN. CODE at
2045 (Cum. Supp. 1947).
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(b).
35. E.g., Whitcomb v. Horman, 244 Md. 431, 443, 224 A.2d 120, 126 (1966); Tri-
State Properties, Inc. v. Middleman, 238 Md. 41, 47, 207 A.2d 499, 502 (1965); Gemmell
v. Davis, 71 Md. 458, 464, 18 A. 955, 956 (1889).
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summary judgment procedure provides a mechanism by which it can
be ascertained if a factual dispute exists which will necessitate a
trial. The procedure, however, is not intended as a substitute for a
trial or as a fact-finding device. 36 If no genuine issue as to any
material fact exists, the court may then resolve the case upon the
issues of law. Thus, if "reasonable minds could reach but one
conclusion from the uncontroverted facts, those questions of fact are
for the Court to decide as a matter of law. '' 37 If a material factual
dispute is found to exist, however, the motion must be denied and a
trial will be necessary. It is not the presence of any factual dispute
that negates the summary judgment procedure. Rather, the dispute
must relate to a material fact, one whose resolution "will somehow
affect the outcome of the case."' 38 As the Court of Appeals has
expressed it, "a dispute as to facts relating to grounds upon which
the decision is not rested is not a dispute with respect to a material
fact and such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary
judgment."3 9
The Court of Appeals has not announced very definite standards
to guide a trial judge in determining whether a factual dispute exists.
The late Judge Charles Clark of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, an eminent scholar of summary judgment
practice, found a loose approach to be the most desirable:
There is no desire to minimize the problem before the courts
.... What is needed is the application of common sense, good
judgment, and decisive action, on the one hand, not to shut a
deserving litigant from his trial and, on the other, not to allow
harassment of an equally deserving suitor for immediate relief
by a long and worthless trial. Formulas and cliches will not
help, and the announcement of rolling precedents will only
embarrass in the future.40
What Judge Clark suggested appears to be what the Court of Appeals
has in fact adopted.
Because of its limited role, the summary judgment procedure has
uniformly been held not to infringe upon a party's right to a jury
36. E.g., Lipscomb v. Hess, 255 Md. 109, 118, 257 A.2d 178, 182-83 (1969).
37. Brady v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 254 Md. 598, 604, 255 A.2d 427, 430
(1969). Accord, Owens v. Simon, 245 Md. 404, 409, 226 A.2d 548, 551 (1967).
38. Parklawn v. Nee, 243 Md. 249, 254, 220 A.2d 563, 566 (1966).
39. Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 40, 300
A.2d 367, 374 (1973) (emphasis in original). Accord, Lynx, Inc. v. Ordinance Prods.,
Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8, 327 A.2d 502, 509 (1974).
40. Clark, Summary Judgment, 36 MINN. L. REv. 567, 578-79 (1952).
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trial;4 1 however, the Court of Appeals has never fully explicated this
position. Like its cousin, the directed verdict,42 it "merely permit[s] a
justifiable determination that there is nothing for a jury to
consider." 43
INTERPRETING RULE 610
A comparison of rule 610, as promulgated in 1947, with the 1947
version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, which had been in
effect and unamended for eight years, reveals significant similari-
ties. Obviously, the Maryland draftsmen followed the lead of rule 56,
and consequently, decisions interpreting the federal rule should be
given great weight in construing and applying rule 610.
Although the differences between the two rules in 1947 were
relatively minor, the Maryland rule did tend to promote more liberal
use of summary judgment. For example, under the federal rule a
plaintiff must generally wait twenty days after filing his complaint
before he can serve the defendant with a summary judgment
motion. 44 In Maryland, however, a plaintiff may file such a motion
and his initial pleading concurrently. 45 Unlike the federal rule, the
Maryland rule expressly permits the court "[w]here appropriate...
[to] render judgment for [an] opposing party even though he has not
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment." 46 Although federal case
law permits this result,47 federal rule 56 does not explicitly sanction
it.
41. Because the summary judgment rules "merely operate to determine what, if
any, issues are to be tried by jury," they "do not impair the right of trial by jury."
Fletcher v. Flournoy, 198 Md. 53, 61, 81 A.2d 232, 235 (1951). See generally 10 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, §2714.
42. See Lynx, Inc. v. Ordnance Prods., Inc., 273 Md. 1, 8, 327 A.2d 502, 509 (1974).
For a comparison of the two procedural devices, see Knisley v. Keller, 11 Md. App. 269,
273 A.2d 624 (1971).
43. Frush v. Brooks, 204 Md. 315, 324, 104 A.2d 624, 628 (1954).
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
45. See MD. GEN. R. PRAc. & P., IV. Summary Judgment, rule 1(a), MD. ANN.
CODE at 2044 (Cum. Supp. 1947) (currently MD. R.P. 610(a)(1)). The federal rule was
intended to safeguard defendants and to give them time to "secure counsel and
determine a course of action." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (Notes of Advisory Committee on
1946 Amendment). Defendants in Maryland are protected in this situation by rule
610(c)(1)'s requirement that a hearing on the motion not take place until 15 days after
the return day.
46. MD. R.P. 610(dXl).
47. See 1955 Report of the Advisory Committee, Proposed Amendments to the
Rules of Civil Procedure for the United States District Courts, Rule 56(c), reprinted in
12 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLR, supra note 3, at 612-13 (Appendix F). The 1955
amendments were not adopted.
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Another minor difference existing in 1947, which has only
recently proven significant, was that under the federal rule a party
moving for summary judgment could, and today still can, move
"with or without supporting affidavits. ' 48 In Maryland where a
plaintiff can simultaneously file the initial pleading and motion for
summary judgment, such a motion had to be accompanied by a
supporting affidavit. 49 Originally, neither rule required the party
opposing the motion to file a countering affidavit. In 1961 the
Maryland rule was amended to require a countering affidavit or
other document by the adverse party, but only in the limited
situations in which the moving party was required to file a
supporting affidavit.50 In 1963 the federal rule was also amended,
but it went a step further, requiring an opposing affidavit or other
document whenever the moving party supported the motion with an
affidavit or other documentary evidence.51 As discussed below,52
Maryland's failure to keep in step with this federal change has led to
much confusion.
Other minor differences aside,53 the two rules are quite similar.
As the Court of Appeals has noted, rule 610 "was [intended] not to
restrict or narrow, but to broaden, the federal rule." 54 When
ambiguities arise in construing rule 610, the court has declared that
interpretations of rule 56 are "especially persuasive" in ascertaining
the meaning of rule 610. 5 5
TIMING OF THE MOTION, NOTICE, AND HEARING
A motion for summary judgment may be filed at any time after
the action has been commenced. 56 Absent a court order to the
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a)4b).
49. MD. R.P. 610(a)(3).
50. MD. R.P. 610(a)(3) (amended Sept. 15, 1961).
51. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (Notes of Advisory Committee on 1963 Amendment).
52. See pp. 207-10 infra.
53. The Maryland rule has unique timing requirements for hearing motions not
present in the federal rule. See MD. R.P. 610(c). This is due primarily to Maryland's
practice of permitting plaintiffs to file summary judgment motions with their initial
pleadings. See MD. R.P. 610(a)(1).
The federal rule originally omitted answers to interrogatories among the
materials that may be considered on summary judgment. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)
(Notes of Advisory Committee on 1963 Amendment). Although the federal rule has
been amended to permit the review of such materials, Maryland has not followed suit.
It appears, however, that the Court of Appeals and Court of Special Appeals have
approved the use of interrogatory answers for this purpose. See text accompanying
note 144 infra.
54. Fletcher v. Flournoy, 198 Md. 53, 57, 81 A.2d 232, 233 (1951).
55. Frush v. Brooks, 204 Md. 315, 321,104 A.2d 624, 626 (1954) (citing U.O. Colson
Co. v. Goff, 204 Md. 160, 102 A.2d 548 (1954)).
56. MD. R.P. 610(a)(1).
[VOL. 38
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN MARYLAND
contrary, the filing of this motion does not affect the filing date for a
party's other pleadings. 57 The proper timing of the court's hearing on
the motion depends on when it was filed. A party whose motion for
summary judgment has been filed before an opponent has filed his
initial pleading cannot obtain a hearing on the motion until fifteen
days after the return day and upon not less than fifteen days notice
to the opposing party.58 This timing sequence also applies when a
plaintiff has filed his motion with his complaint. If, however, the
party moves for summary judgment after his opponent has filed an
initial pleading, the motion can be heard at any time after not less
than ten days notice.5 9 A summary judgment motion that isheard
and granted before the expiration of this time period can be reversed
on appeal.6° Whenever the motion is filed, it must advise the
opponent of "the time at or after which the motion may be heard, '"61
and, in the case of a motion filed before the opponent's initial
pleading, notice must also be given to the opponent that his failure
to plead timely could result in judgment being entered against him. 62
As the timing of the motion suggests, the summary judgment
procedure can provide plaintiffs with an extremely prompt method
for resolving their claims. If the rule is applicable, the delays
inherent in a trial can be avoided, and a judgment obtained within a
couple of months.
Rule 610 sets no limit on how late a summary judgment motion
can be filed, and it appears that a party could file such a motion in
the midst of trial.63 The only logical impediment to the resolution of
such a motion would arise when it would unduly surprise the
opposing party, denying him sufficient time in which to obtain
countering affidavits, or perhaps to proffer opposing evidence with
live witnesses. 64 If it becomes clear at trial that no material issue of
57. MD. R.P. 610(a)(2). This rule could be awkward for a defendant who has
moved for summary judgment before answering a plaintiffs complaint. His answer
would be due before the motion was ruled upon. In this situation he obviously should
seek an extension of time within which to answer under Maryland rule 309.
58. MD. R.P. 610(c)(1).
59. MD. R.P. 610(cX2). See Concord Co. v. Matherly, 216 Md. 453, 459, 140 A.2d
900, 903 (1958). The party opposing summary judgment can, of course, waive this time
limit.
60. Concord Co. v. Matherly, 216 Md. 453, 460, 140 A.2d 900, 904 (1958).
61. MD. R.P. 610(c)(1)-(2).
62. MD. R.P. 610(c)(1).
63. This was permitted in Placido v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 38 Md. App. 33,
41, 379 A.2d 773, 778 (1977). No other reported Maryland case or other authority
appears to have considered this issue.
64. Id. at 42, 379 A.2d at 778.
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fact exists between the parties, time and energy could surely be
saved by invoking the summary judgment device. Nevertheless, if
the interests of the opposing party could not be safeguarded or if no
appreciable time savings were evident, the trial judge should surely
have the discretion to refuse to resolve an inexcusably tardy and
disruptive summary judgment motion.
REQUIREMENT THAT A MOTION BE FILED
The Maryland case law is equivocal as to whether trial judges
can invoke the summary judgment procedures on their own, without
waiting for a motion to be filed by one of the parties. In several
instances, the Court of Appeals has assumed that this practice is
permissible, but on each occasion no supporting rationale or
substantiated precedent for such a rule was offered.65 It would
appear that Maryland trial courts possess this power, but that its
exercise should be tightly circumscribed.
Rule 610 does not provide a satisfactory answer to this question.
Rule 610(a)(1) states that a party "may at any time make a motion
for a summary judgment in his favor." Although it might be implied,
the rule does not specifically say that a party "must" file a motion in
order to reap its benefits, nor does it discuss whether the court could
raise the motion sua sponte. 66 Thus, the text of rule 610(a)(1) adds
little to the resolution of this issue.
When one party moves for summary judgment, and the court
realizes that no factual dispute exists and that the law favors the
opposing party, rule 610(d)(1) gives the court discretion to enter a
"judgment for the opposing party even though he has not filed a
cross-motion for summary judgment." Thus, the rule specifically
waives the need for a summary judgment motion from the benefiting
party in this situation, and this exemption could support the
argument that if the rule makers had intended to waive the motion
requirement entirely, they knew how to do so and would have done
so explicitly. Rule 610(d)(1) might also be interpreted as giving rise to
a negative inference that the filing of a motion is required of a party
who is not in this special situation. Otherwise, there would be no
need for rule 610(d)(1). Rule 610's failure to confront this problem
directly, however, does not compel a single resolution of this issue.
65. See text accompanying notes 67 to 84 infra.
66. But cf. Dudley v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 255 Md. 247, 254, 257 A.2d 437, 442
(1969) ("Entry of summary judgment has been approved by this Court under the last
sentence of Rule 610 d 1 and the inherent power of the court, although the summary
judgment rules had not been fully complied with.").
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The existing case law is more explicit. In Preissman v.
Harmatz,67 the most recent Maryland Court of Appeals case to deal
with this question, a party claimed that because his opponents'
summary judgment motion and supporting affidavit were defective
in form, the motion should not have been granted. Without engaging
in an analysis of the particular defects in question, the court stated
in dictum that "[tihe short answer to this contention is that even if
[the motion and affidavit] were [defective in form], a court may enter
summary judgment of its own motion where there is no genuine
dispute as to a material fact. . ."68 Preissman made no attempt to
explain the "longer answer" to the question;69 instead, it merely cited
Hunt v. Montgomery County7O and Fletcher v. Flournoy7' as
supporting authority.72
Hunt was similarly devoid of reasoning. It simply declared that
"[e]ven though no formal motion for summary judgment under the
rules was made, there was before the court enough to justify its
action in granting a summary declaratory judgment," 73 and cited
Fletcher and Frush v. Brooks74 for support. In Fletcher the
defendant filed a summary judgment motion that was deficient in
numerous respects 75 but was nevertheless granted by the trial court.
On review the Court of Appeals indicated that these technical
deficiencies would have been sufficient grounds for the trial court to
have denied the motion. 76 Because the record showed that there was
67. 264 Md. 715, 288 A.2d 180 (1972).
68. Id. at 721, 288 A.2d at 184 (dictum).
69. The Preissman court's brief remarks also failed to distinguish between
situations in which no motion is filed at all and those in which a defective one is filed.
Because the party in Preissman did trigger the summary judgment process with a
motion, albeit defective, it presented a much easier case in which to waive the motion
requirement. Although its language implies a broader ruling, Preissman's dictum
must be limited to the proposition that summary judgment can be entertained when
raised by a defective motion.
70. 248 Md. 403, 237 A.2d 35 (1968).
71. 198 Md. 53, 81 A.2d 232 (1951).
72. The Preissman court also cited Myers v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 253 Md.
282, 252 A.2d 855 (1969), as support. Stating that a "court may enter summary
judgment of its own motion," the Myers court relied totally on Hunt and Fletcher. Id.
at 290, 252 A.2d at 860.
73. 248 Md. at 411, 237 A.2d at 39.
74. 204 Md. 315, 104 A.2d 624 (1954).
75. The defendant's motion departed from the language authorized by the
summary judgment rule, and the issue was whether the trial court, in granting such a
motion, had committed a reversible error even if it appeared that in fact there were
adequate grounds for granting summary judgment. Also, contrary to the summary
judgment rule, the defendant's supporting affidavit was not made on personal
knowledge. 198 Md. at 56-60, 81 A.2d at 233-34.
76. Id. at 56, 81 A.2d at 233.
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no genuine dispute as to any material fact, the court upheld the trial
court's grant of summary judgment. Reasoning that "a motion is not
always an indispensable prerequisite to obtaining a summary
judgment, ' 77 the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant's right
to summary judgment was not "defeated by [his] disregard of
provisions of the Summary Judgment rules.178
Although these statements have led later Court of Appeals
panels to state that a motion is not a general prerequisite to the
granting of summary judgment, Fletcher clearly does not stand for
this proposition. First, because a motion had indeed been filed in
Fletcher, its conclusion that a motion is "not always an indispensa-
ble prerequisite to obtaining summary judgment" is purely dictum.
Second, its sole supporting authority was the predecessor to the
current rule 610(d)(1), which, as noted above,79 explicitly waives the
motion requirement only where summary judgment is to be awarded
to a party who has not filed a cross-motion. Thus, Fletcher should
not have been cited by Preissman and Hunt in support of the
proposition that no motion need be filed in other circumstances.
This leaves Frush as the next precedential authority that
ostensibly permits a trial court to invoke summary judgment
procedures sua sponte, but it too has its flaws. Again in pure dictum,
the Court of Appeals implied that a court could grant summary
judgment on its own motion8 ° without elaboration. Instead of ex-
plaining why and under what circumstances a court might grant
summary judgment sua sponte, the Frush court relied upon
Hamburger v. Standard Lime & Stone Co.,8' a case which lies at the
root of this long line of dicta, but has nothing to do with the stated
proposition. In that case motions for summary judgments had been
filed, and the court said nothing about the legal result had they not
been. The case allegedly involved a defective affidavit, but the
central issue was whether the trial court had jurisdiction to grant the
motions and enter the judgments.8 2 Thus, Hamburger offers no
77. Id. at 57, 81 A.2d at 233 (dictum).
78. Id. at 63, 81 A.2d at 236-37.
79. See p. 79 supra.
80. The Frush court stated that "[t]he court had jurisdiction of the parties and the
subject matter and if it had granted a summary judgment of its own motion, this
alone would not affect an otherwise valid judgment." 204 Md. at 322, 104 A.2d at 627
(dictum).
81. 198 Md. 336, 84 A.2d 74 (1951). In Ehrlich v. Board of Educ., 257 Md. 542, 546,
263 A.2d 853, 856 (1970), the Court of Appeals, again in dictum, cited Frush and
implied that the filing of a motion was not a prerequisite to the granting of summary
judgment.
82. 198 Md. at 339, 84 A.2d at 75-76.
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support for the proposition that summary judgment may be invoked
by the court sua sponte.
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals has not accepted the
Hamburger to Preissman line of cases. Without citing that line of
cases, the court in Harris v. Stenfanowicz Corp.8 3 recently indicated
that the summary judgment procedure must be initiated by motion
of a party and not "by a court's peremptory action initiated sua
sponte." 84 The court's primary authority for this statement was
apparently rule 610(a)(1) which states, "a party ... may at any time
make a motion for summary judgment."
Faced with the equivocal wording of rule 610 and inadequate
and confused legal precedents, the Court of Appeals should be free to
fashion its own rule in this regard. If a case clearly contains no
factual dispute, but neither party is apparently aware of the proper
procedural device in such circumstances, the trial court's control of
its docket would be jeopardized if such a case could not be
expeditiously resolved by summary judgment. There is no justifica-
tion for tying a trial judge's hands and forcing him to conduct an
unnecessary trial. If summary procedures are clearly warranted, the
court could, at the very least, suggest to both parties that they
should file summary judgment motions to resolve their case. This
approach would prompt most attorneys to file the necessary motions
and thereby avoid the need to determine whether trial judges could
grant summary judgment sua sponte.
Two conditions should be met before judicial intervention into a
party's conduct of his own strategy should be permitted. First, any
sua sponte or court-prompted summary judgment motion must give
the opposing party ample notice and an opportunity to oppose it.85
Although this may, at times, delay the resolution of a case, the need
for notice should pose no great judicial obstacle. Second, because our
adversary system is based on the model of a passive judge, the
parties should be required to develop their own case. Too much
judicial interference might undermine a party's right to develop his
own strategy independently, and it could place the court in the
awkward position of becoming an adversary who must decide when
it will "file" a summary judgment motion for an erring attorney. The
discretion associated with such strategic choices has traditionally
83. 26 Md. App. 213, 337 A.2d 455 (1975).
84. Id. at 218, 337 A.2d at 458.
85. Cf. Harris v. Stefanowicz Corp., 26 Md. App. 213, 220, 337 A.2d 455, 459 (1975)
(under MD. R.P. 502, courts, on their own motion, may consider issues of law at any
time, but generally parties are given some warning and opportunity to prepare their
responses).
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been left to the litigants in our adversary process.8 6 To permit the
courts to encroach upon this polarized system would significantly
weaken that process. Aggressive judicial intervention might also
have the undesired side effect of encouraging lawyers to remain
ignorant of the rules of procedure and to allow the court to conduct
their litigation. If no motion or adequate affidavit need be filed by a
party and a helpful trial judge can be expected to plead a party's
case, what motivation is there for the attorney to learn and comply
with the rules?8 7 On balance these considerations counsel that the
trial court's power to invoke summary judgment sua sponte should
exist but be employed sparingly. It should be reserved for cases in
which the resolution of a dispute will be readily enhanced by judicial
intervention, while not undermining the tradition of adversarial
independence that is the hallmark of our judicial system.
- THE REQUIREMENT THAT AFFIDAVITS BE FILED
The most troublesome aspect of summary judgment practice in
Maryland is rule 610's requirement that the motion or its opposition
be supported under certain circumstances by affidavits or other
evidentiary documents. Even though the rule is equivocal as to
exactly what is required of the parties, there is a confusing
divergence between what it clearly does require and what the courts
are, in fact, demanding. Generally, a party moving for summary
judgment will file along with his motion one or more supporting
affidavits which establish the relevant facts and demonstrate the
lack of any genuine dispute as to their existence. The rules, however,
do not require that affidavits accompany all motions for summary
judgment. Rule 610(a)(3) specifically states: "The motion must be
supported by affidavit when filed with the pleading asserting the
claim or before the adverse party has filed his initial pleading to it;
otherwise the motion may be made with or without supporting
affidavits." 88 Thus, a plaintiff must file a supporting affidavit with
any motion filed at the time he files his complaint or until the
defendant has answered.8 9 But if the motion is filed at a later time, it
may be filed "with or without supporting affidavits." 9 If the
86. For a discussion of several of these strategies, see pp. 221-24 infra.
87. In Fletcher v. Flournoy, 198 Md. 53, 81 A.2d 232 (1951), for example, the Court
of Appeals lamented that in practice there existed "a very great neglect of all
regularity in the form of [summary judgment] affidavits." Id. at 58, 81 A.2d at 234.
88. Md. R.P. 610(a)(3).
89. Id. See White v. Friel, 210 Md. 274, 280, 123 A.2d 303, 305 (1956); Frush v.
Brooks, 204 Md. 315, 319, 104 A.2d 624, 625 (1954).
90. MD. R.P. 610(a)(3). Accord, Fletcher v. Flournoy, 198 Md. 53, 58, 81 A.2d 232,
233-34 (1951).
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defendant should counterclaim and seek summary judgment on the
counterclaim, he must file an affidavit with his motion if it is filed at
the time of his counterclaim or before the plaintiff answers the
counterclaim. The same sequence would apply to cross-claims and
third party claims. Under the wording of the rule, however, if the
defendant files for summary judgment on an affirmative defense set
forth in his answer or plea to the plaintiffs claim, rule 610
apparently excuses him from filing a supporting affidavit l because
the filing of a responsive pleading by the plaintiff, such as a reply or
replication, is not required.9 2
One justification for this distinction is that the record typically
will be sparse before a party's initial responsive pleading is filed;
consequently, an affidavit should accompany a summary judgment
motion filed during that period in order to provide the court with a
basis for an informed decision. Because the record will usually be
more fully developed later in the litigation, the need for a supporting
affidavit would then no longer exist. If this is the basis for rule 610's
distinction, it is a tenuous rationale at best. There is no assurance
that the record will be adequately supplemented. However weak this
rationale might be, it is nevertheless difficult to imagine a better
justification. As demonstrated below, 93 the best rule is one that
requires an affidavit or other supporting document in nearly all
instances.
When an affidavit is mandatory, rule 610 requires an opposing
party who desires to controvert any statements of fact in the
movant's affidavit to respond with a countering affidavit or
deposition. 94 These documents must be filed prior to, or along with,
the filing by the opposing party of his initial responsive pleading,
unless time is extended.95 "The failure to file such opposing affidavit
91. But see Alamo Trailer Sales, Inc. v. Howard County Metro. Comm'n, 243 Md.
666, 668, 222 A.2d 181, 182 (1966); text accompanying notes 110 to 112 infra.
92. MD. R.P. 312(a) eliminates, for example, the need for a plaintiff to file a
replication countering the affirmative defenses in a defendant's answer or plea. Under
the rule, the plaintiff is automatically deemed to have denied all allegations regarding
any defenses. MD. R.P. 312(b). Rule 312 nevertheless permits a plaintiff in this
situation to file a reply if he so chooses. It might be argued that the filing of an
optional reply would bring the defendant within the terms of rule 610(aX3)'s affidavit
requirement and, therefore, render a summary judgment motion deficient if not
accompanied by an affidavit.
93. See pp. 204-10 infra.
94. MD. R.P. 610(aX3). See Frush v. Brooks, 204 Md. 318, 320-21, 104 A.2d 624,626
(1954).
95. MD. R.P. 610(aX3). Although the rule is silent on this point, it also seems
proper for the opposing party to counter with answers to interrogatories, admissions
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or deposition shall constitute an admission for purposes of the
motion of all statements of fact in the affidavit of the moving party,
but shall not constitute an admission that such motion or affidavit is
legally sufficient. ' 96 In those situations in which the opposing party
is not required to file a countering affidavit, but nevertheless chooses
to do so, the affidavit must be filed at or before the hearing on the
motion.9 7 Under rule 610, summary judgment motions filed after the
opposing party's initial responsive pleading, which need not be
supported by an affidavit, do not need to be responded to with an
affidavit from the opposing party. Even when the moving party has
filed supporting affidavits in this situation, rule 610(a)(3) still does
not require the opposing party to file a countering affidavit or
deposition. 98
If rule 610 is taken at face value, an opposing party in cases in
which no affidavit is required could merely rest on the more general
denials of his pleadings, using them to show that a factual dispute
persists between the parties. In numerous reported cases, Maryland
attorneys appear to have followed just such a procedure but have
paid dearly for it, losing their cases. In part, the reason for this
surprising result is that the Court of Appeals has apparently
imposed additional demands upon the parties to a summary
judgment proceeding beyond those literally required by rule 610. In
Foley v. County Commissioners,99 for example, the plaintiffs
challenged the legality of the Carroll County Commissioners'
approval of a particular sanitary district. The commissioners
responded with a motion for summary judgment that was supported
- although rule 610 does not require it - with affidavits and
under Maryland rule 421, or stipulations by the parties. These documents would also
demonstrate the existence of a genuine dispute as to a material fact, which would
make a grant of summary judgment improper.
96. MD. R.P. 610(a)(3).
97. Id. The tardiness and delay sanctioned by this rule are unfortunate. By
permitting opposing parties to wait to file opposing affidavits until the day of the
hearing on the motion, rule 610(a)(3) creates unnecessary hearings and delays of
hearings. A moving party might withdraw his motion if his opponent's affidavit
confirms the existence of a disputed fact, but under rule 610(a)(3)'s procedure, he
might not be able to discover the existence of a dispute until he arrives for the
hearing. Similarly, the moving party might need time to respond to an affidavit not
filed until the day of the hearing. He may, for example, want to file a supplemental
affidavit to clarify a point, as permitted by rule 610(b). This could easily lead to a
continuance, thus wasting precious court and attorney time and client money. The
federal rules have minimized this difficulty by requiring the opposing party to file
countering affidavits "prior to the day of hearing." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
98. See Hill v. Lewis, 21 Md. App. 121, 134 n.9, 318 A.2d 850, 858 n.9 (1974).
99. 247 Md. 162, 230 A.2d 298 (1967).
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exhibits to demonstrate that the district was properly created. 100
Although the plaintiffs had filed an affidavit supporting their
opposition to the summary judgment motion, they claimed that
because the defendant's motion and supporting documents had not
refuted two facts set forth in their declaration, as opposed to their
affidavit, a dispute of fact existed, thereby precluding summary
judgment. 10' The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding
that "the supporting and opposing affidavits must submit eviden-
tiary facts to the court."10 2 Because the "facts" relied upon were not
submitted in the plaintiffs' affidavit, they were held insufficient to
raise an issue of fact and, therefore, to defeat the summary judgment
motion.10 3 Similarly, in Dietz v. Moore,104 which involved challenges
to a will alleging lack of execution and undue influence, the
caveatees, following discovery, filed a motion for summary judgment
supported by answers to interrogatories. 05 In reply the caveators
presented no affidavits or any other admissible evidence regarding
the question of execution to contradict the caveatees' presentation of
facts. 10 6 Although rule 610 does not appear to require such an
affidavit, the Court of Appeals held that because the caveators had
"utterly failed to establish that there was a 'genuine dispute as to a
material fact,"' summary judgment was properly granted. 0 7 Tri-
State Properties, Inc. v. Middleman10 8 and Brown v. Suburban
Cadillac, Inc.109 followed the same pattern. The defendant in each
case filed for summary judgment and chose to support the motion
with affidavits. The plaintiffs then responded by filing opposing
affidavits, although they are apparently not required by rule 610. In
both cases, the Court of Appeals held that the countering affidavits
were too general and failed to show with sufficient specificity that a
factual dispute actually existed. Thus, the inadequacy of the
opposing parties' voluntarily filed affidavits resulted in the grant of
100. Id. at 165, 230 A.2d at 299.
101. Id. at 175, 230 A.2d at 305.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. 277 Md. 1, 351 A.2d 428 (1976).
105. See Joint Record Extract at E.51-E.55.
106. 277 Md. at 5, 351 A.2d at 432. With respect to the allegation of undue
influence, the caveators did offer affidavits, but the Court of Appeals noted that they
dealt only with the issue of competency which had been submitted to the jury.
107. Id. at 5, 351 A.2d at 431. Summary judgment has been granted in cases in
similar procedural postures. Carter v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 25 Md. App. 717,336
A.2d 790 (1975); Hill v. Lewis, 21 Md. App. 121, 318 A.2d 850 (1974).
108. 238 Md. 41, 207 A.2d 499 (1965).
109. 260 Md. 251, 272 A.2d 42 (1971).
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adverse summary judgments. Similarly, in Alamo Trailer Sales, Inc.
v. Howard County Metropolitan Commission,110 the defendant
moved for summary judgment on the claims of a portion of the
plaintiffs amended complaint and attached a proper affidavit and
exhibits. No opposing affidavit was filed by the plaintiff,"' as
apparently permitted by rule 610(a)(3). The Court of Appeals,
however, stated: "Since no opposing affidavit was filed, we must
conclude that Alamo has admitted, for purposes of the motion, all
statements of fact in the Commission's affidavit. Maryland Rule
610a3."' 2 Although all of these cases failed to address the contrary
implication of rule 610 regarding the mandatory filing of countering
affidavits, they do stand for the proposition that parties who fail to
file such an affidavit - one that meets the various requirements
demanded of a proper summary judgment affidavit - will not be
able to rest on their pleadings to show the existence of a genuine
factual dispute.
The court has generally followed this pattern of requiring proper
affidavits even when rule 610 does not, but its decisions have
certainly conveyed mixed messages to the bar. In Khoyan v.
Turnerl 3 the plaintiff brought a negligence action alleging that the
defendant left his keys in the ignition of his parked car, thereby
allowing the car to be stolen and to collide later with plaintiffs
parked car. The defendant responded by filing a motion for
summary judgment unaccompanied by an affidavit. The plaintiff
opposed the motion and, without a supporting affidavit, countered
with one of his own.114 Later, in answer to an interrogatory
110. 243 Md. 666, 222 A.2d 181 (1966).
111. Id. at 668, 222 A.2d at 182.
112. Id. Poe's treatise cites Alamo as support for the proposition that when a
defendant files for summary judgment prior to filing his first pleading, rule 610(a)(3)'s
wording requires that both he and the plaintiff file affidavits; if the plaintiff files no
countering affidavit, the facts in the defendant's affidavit will be held to have been
conceded. See 4 PoE's PLEADING, supra note 18, § 409, at 21.
Rule 610(a)(3) requires an affidavit when the motion is filed with "the
pleading asserting the claim" or "before the adverse party has filed his initial
pleading to it." In Alamo, the plaintiff had already filed its bill for declaratory relief
and the opposing party, moving for summary judgment, did not file a concurrent
claim with its motion which would have been a cross-claim or counterclaim. Instead,
it sought summary judgment with respect to a defense to the plaintiff's claim. Thus,
the rule clearly required no countering affidavit. Consequently, the failure to file such
an affidavit should not, under rule 610(a)(3), constitute an admission of the opposing
party's factual claims, and Alamo should not have been based upon such a reading of
rule 610(a)(3). The decision does not reveal its underlying rationale.
113. 255 Md. 144, 257 A.2d 219 (1969).
114. Although neither party offered supporting affidavits in conjunction with his
summary judgment motion, the defendant filed a "memorandum of points and
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propounded by the plaintiff, the defendant stated that he had not left
his keys in the ignition of his car. The plaintiffs only rebuttal to this
claim was his contrary allegation in the complaint. The Court of
Appeals, however, held that the pleading allegation was sufficient to
pose a genuine dispute over a material fact, and accordingly
reversed the trial judge's summary judgment ruling for the
defendant. Thus, an apparently unverified complaint was deemed
sufficient to rebut the statement of fact in support of the defendant's
motion. It is obviously difficult to reconcile this result with the
aforementioned cases. 115
In Trustees of Bradfording Church of the Brethren v. Western
Maryland Railway'1 6 the court was faced with a plaintiffs motion
for summary judgment and supporting documents (which were filed
nearly a decade after the parties' initial pleadings), and the
defendants' unverified answer to the motion, which simply alleged
that there was a genuine dispute as to material facts and denied that
the plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 117
Apparently, no affidavits or other documents were filed by the
defendants. The Court of Appeals held that the unverified answer to
the motion was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact with respect
to at least one of the defendants and that summary judgment should
therefore have been denied. 1i s This decision is also squarely at odds
with Foley, Dietz, Tri-State, Brown, and Alamo.119
Decisions can also be found lying between these two extremes.
Fletcher v. Flournoy, 20 a leading summary judgment case, declared
that an affidavit is not required to support a summary judgment
motion filed after the opposing party has filed a pleading "if not
required by the nature of the case."' 21 Another case noted that it
merely would be the "better practice" to file such supporting
documentation, although the rules may not require it.122
A requirement that a party opposing summary judgment always
respond to the moving party's affidavit with a countering affidavit
or other document, as mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil
authorities" with his motion as did the plaintiff with his opposition to the motion. Id.
at 146, 257 A.2d at 220.
115. See text accompanying notes 99 to 112 supra.
116. 262 Md. 84, 277 A.2d 276 (1971).
117. Id. at 87, 277 A.2d at 278.
118. Id. at 89, 277 A.2d at 279. See also Burrell v. Frisby, 212 Md. 181, 129 A.2d 75
(1957).
119. See text accompanying notes 99 to 112 supra.
120. 198 Md. 53, 81 A.2d 232 (1951). See text accompanying notes 75 to 79 supra.
121. 198 Md. at 58, 81 A.2d at 234.
122. Williams v. Knapp, 248 Md. 506, 512, 237 A.2d 450, 454 (1968).
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Procedure, 123 would surely be a desirable change in Maryland's
summary judgment procedure. Because summary judgment is
intended to pierce the pleadings and to require a higher degree of
proof to demonstrate that a factual dispute exists, necessitating a
trial for its resolution, the value of this procedural device is
undermined if parties are merely permitted to rest on the unverified
allegations of their pleadings. If an unverified pleading is permitted
to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the savings in time and
needless trials, which the procedure seeks to foster, is lost. In such a
situation there is no middle route - short of trial, but beyond the
pleadings - by which cases actually posing no factual disagree-
ments can be spotted and peremptorily resolved. The Court of
Appeals has recognized the dilemma posed by the ambiguity of rule
610, and noted that if vague and general allegations in an opposing
affidavit were sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment,
"the real and crucial purposes of summary judgment procedure - to
avoid delays and unnecessary costs - would be subverted and
thwarted ... [and] there would be few, if any, summary judgments
granted. ' 124 If no affidavit is required to be filed, this problem is
greatly compounded.
The ambiguity inherent in Maryland's rule 610 also existed in
the federal rule prior to 1963. Decisions of the Third Circuit1 25
interpreted federal rule 56 to permit an unverified pleading to rebut
claims of no factual dispute in a motion for summary judgment and
its supporting affidavit.1 26 Recognizing that this application of the
123. The federal rules permit a party to move with or without supporting
affidavits. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(a)-(b). If the motion is made with a supporting affidavit,
however, the adverse party must respond with a countering affidavit or other
evidence, FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e), or he will be deemed to have conceded the moving
party's factual assertions. See id.124. Tri-State Prop., Inc. v. Middleman, 238 Md. 41, 47, 207 A.2d 499, 502 (1965).
See, e.g., Wyand v. Patterson Agency, Inc., 266 Md. 456, 460, 295 A.2d 773, 775 (1972).
125. E.g., Frederick Hart & Co. v. Recordgraph Corp., 169 F.2d 580, 581 & n.1 (3d
Cir. 1948) (dictum).
126. As the Federal Rules Advisory Committee explained:
The last two sentences are added to overcome a line of cases, chiefly in the
Third Circuit, which has impaired the utility of the summary judgment
device. A typical case is as follows: A party supports his motion for summary
judgment by affidavits or other evidentiary matter sufficient to show that
there is no genuine issue as to a material fact. The adverse party, in opposing
the motion, does not produce any evidentiary matter, or produces some but not
enough to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial. Instead, the adverse
party rests on averments of his pleadings which on their face present an
issue. In this situation Third Circuit cases have taken the view that summary
judgment must be denied, at least if the averments are "well-pleaded," and not
supposititous, conclusory, or ultimate.
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (Notes of Advisory Committee on 1963 Amendment).
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rule did not encourage the piercing of the pleadings by requiring
more reliable evidentiary proof regarding the existence of a factual
dispute, the Supreme Court eliminated this possibility by amending
federal rule 56 in 1963 to read as follows:
When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule,
must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine
issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if
appropriate, shall be entered against him.12 7
A similar amendment to rule 610 would be appropriate. The
affidavits or other supporting documents are to assist the judge in
determining if a material dispute exists. Rule 610 requires that these
affidavits or other documents "set forth such facts as would be
admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant
is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."'128 Pleadings,
which normally need not be verified, generally will not satisfy these
requirements. A pleading need not be sworn to; it may include
information based on inadmissible evidence; and it need not
establish the speaker's ability to testify as to its allegations.
Consequently, it presents a much less convincing guarantee of the
truth of its allegations. Although affidavits lack the full tests of
truth available at trial - cross-examination of credibility and
observation of demeanor - they are a better test of truth than the
mere allegations of a pleading. Summary judgment procedures can
be effective if this higher level of truth telling is required. They mark
the midpoint between bare allegations and the scrutiny allegations
receive at trial and permit the weeding out of assertions that could
not even stand the test of the affidavit's safeguards for truthfullness.
Attention must be paid to resolving the ambiguities of the case
law and the shortcomings of the equivocal rule 610. It appears that
the Court of Appeals intends to follow the federal procedure and to
read into Maryland summary judgment procedures a stiffer
requirement for the filing of affidavits or other supporting docu-
ments by both parties.12 9 This is the only way the procedure can
127. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159 n.20
(1970).
128. MD. R.P. 610(b).
129. Decisions under federal rule 56 are "especially persuasive" in interpreting rule
610 according to the Court of Appeals. See text accompanying note 55 supra.
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function with full efficiency and fairness to all parties. It is quite
possible that the Maryland court's failure to clarify this ambiguity is
the result of an oversight - rule 610 has not been revised since
federal rule 56, the rule upon which it is based, was amended in 1963.
CONTENTS OF THE AFFIDAVIT
Affidavits filed in support of, or in opposition to, a summary
judgment motion must "be made on personal knowledge," "set forth
facts as would be admissible in evidence," and "show affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated
therein."'130 Unfortunately, many cases have come to the Court of
Appeals in which these requirements have not been met. For
example, an affidavit stating "to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief" cannot be relied upon because it is not based
on personal knowledge.' 3 ' Affidavits that fail to assert the compe-
tency of the affiants to testify to the statements contained therein
are ineffective 132 as are affidavits proffering inadmissible hear-
say. 33 An affidavit that merely lists factual issues to be decided or
legal or argumentative conclusions without the support of facts
admissible into evidence and sworn to by a competent affiant cannot
meet rule 610's standard. 34 Likewise, general allegations that do not
detail the precise facts are insufficient to support or oppose summary
judgment.135 An affidavit opposing a motion for summary judgment
need not, however, counter every fact averred or every issue set forth.
It is sufficient for the opposing party to establish a single reason
why a factual dispute remains unresolved or a single legal basis for
rebutting the claim for judgment to defeat the motion. 136
Sometimes a party might file an affidavit that contains
information going beyond the scope of his pleadings. Because the
pleadings set forth the outer bounds of the issues in a case, such an
affidavit may be objectionable. Due to Maryland's very liberal
amendment rule,' 37 however, as long as these broader issues in the
130. MD. R.P. 610(b).
131. E.g., White v. Friel, 210 Md. 274, 280, 123 A.2d 303, 305 (1956); Fletcher v.
Flournoy, 198 Md. 53, 58, 81 A.2d 232, 234 (1951).
132. See, e.g., Ehrlich v. Board of Educ, 257 Md. 542, 546, 263 A.2d 853, 855 (1970).
133. See James v. Tyler, 269 Md. 48, 52, 304 A.2d 256, 259 (1973).
134. Fletcher v. Flournoy, 198 Md. 53, 60, 81 A.2d 232, 235 (1951).
135. E.g., Brown v. Suburban Cadillac, Inc., 260 Md. 251, 257, 272 A.2d 42, 45-46
(1971). See, e.g., Frush v. Brooks, 204 Md. 315, 320-21, 104 A.2d 624, 626 (1954).
136. E.g., Jordan v. Morgan, 252 Md. 122, 128, 249 A.2d 124, 127 (1969); Whalen v.
Devlin Lumber & Supply Corp., 251 Md. 51, 54, 246 A.2d 247, 249 (1968).
137 See MD. R.P. 320. Cf. MD. R.P. 610(d)(5) ("This Rule shall not limit or affect
amendment of the pleadings at any stage of the proceedings.").
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affidavit are within the bounds of permissible amendment to the
pleadings, no serious objection may be sustained regarding such an
affidavit.138 The court at its discretion may also permit the filing of
supplemental or additional affidavits by either party.139 If the
affidavits supporting or opposing the motion refer to other
documents, "sworn, or certified or photostatic copies" must be
attached to the affidavit, "or their absence satisfactorily explain-
ed."'140 The Court of Appeals has deemed a party's failure to obey
this rule to be a "substantive deficiency" which may be reviewed on
appeal even if the issue was not raised at trial.' 4 '
FILING OTHER SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AND EVIDENCE
Documents other than affidavits may also be used to show that
no genuine issue as to a material fact exists.142 For example, a party
may file a deposition by a witness under oath who is competent to
testify and whose statements are based upon personal knowledge143
or file answers to interrogatories, admissions of fact, stipulations, or
concessions. 144 The court can also be requested to take judicial notice
of certain facts. Pleadings can be reviewed to help establish the
absence of a factual dispute. They can also frame those issues about
which there is apparently no factual dispute or demonstrate
admissions, for example, when an allegation is admitted or deemed
138. See 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, 56.11[3], at 56-249, -252 to
-253.
139. MD. R.P. 610(b). The Court of Appeals has permitted the filing of an amended
affidavit three years after the filing for summary judgment when no prejudice
resulted from the delay. Ehrlich v. Board of Educ., 257 Md. 542, 546-47, 263 A.2d 853,
855-56 (1970). Thus, the filing of a movant's affidavit need not coincide with the filing
of the motion.
140. MD. R.P. 610(b). See, e.g., Fishman Constr. Co. v. Hansen, 238 Md. 418,
421-23, 209 A.2d 605, 607-08 (1965).
141. E.g., Finance Co. of America v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 277 Md.
177, 188, 353 A.2d 249, 255 (1976); Wyand v. Patterson Agency, Inc., 266 Md. 456, 461,
295 A.2d 773, 776 (1972). Contra, Fishman Constr. Co. v. Hansen, 238 Md. 418, 424,
209 A.2d 605, 608 (1965) (because this question was not raised below, it could not be
presented for first time on appeal).
142. See Washington Homes, Inc. v. Interstate Land Dev. Co., 281 Md. 712, 717,
382 A.2d 555, 557 (1978); MD. R.P. 610(a)(3), (d)(1)-(2) (court may consider depositions,
pleadings, and admissions on file as well as affidavits).
143. White v. Friel, 210 Md. 274, 280-81, 123 A.2d 303, 305-06 (1956); Vanhook v.
Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 22 Md. App. 22, 26-27, 321 A.2d 540, 543 (1974).
144. Washington Homes, Inc. v. Interstate Land Dev. Co., 281 Md. 712, 717, 382
A.2d 555, 557 (1978). See Khoyan v. Turner, 255 Md. 144, 257 A.2d 219 (1969)
(interrogatory answers).
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admitted. 145 Unverified facts that appear in the pleadings, however,
cannot be used to establish the presence or absence of a genuine
factual dispute.146
Trial courts, with the apparent approval of the Court of Appeals,
have permitted oral testimony at the summary judgment hearing in
order to further clarify the facts and issues. 147 When used in a
limited fashion, this procedure might be helpful in obtaining oral
admissions of fact,148 but, if it were extensively employed, it would
undermine the purpose of the summary judgment procedure - to
avoid the delays of a trial and live testimony.
INABILITY TO FILE COUNTERING AFFIDAVITS
In instances in which a party moving for summary judgment is
required to file a supporting affidavit, rule 610 demands that the
opposing party, if he wishes to contest the facts presented by the
affidavit, respond with a countering affidavit.1 49 If he fails to do so,
the opposing party is deemed by rule 610 to have admitted for
purposes of the motion all statements of fact in the moving party's
affidavits. 150
There are times, however, when an opposing party might find
himself unable to file a countering affidavit because of an
unreachable witness, the need for more discovery, or as is often the
case, because the knowledge of the appropriate facts is primarily
within the moving party's control. In such a situation, rule 610(d)(2)
permits the opposing party to file an affidavit indicating that he
145. See Washington Homes, Inc. v. Interstate Land Dev. Co., 281 Md. 712, 717,
382 A.2d 555, 557 (1978). There can still be situations in which the contents of a
pleading could sufficiently contradict a moving party's claim that no factual dispute
exists. An opposing party's pleading could be verified before a notary public, be based
on the afflant's personal knowledge, consist of admissible evidence, and show that the
affiant is competent to testify. Because the truth safeguards would have been met,
such a pleading, if sufficiently precise and direct, would be the functional equivalent
of a countering affidavit. See 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, 56.11[31,
at 56-250 to -251.
146. See text accompanying notes 99 to 122 supra.
147. See Warren v. Allewalt, 228 Md. 141, 142, 179 A.2d 124, 125 (1962) (per
curiam). Cf. Horst v. Kraft, 247 Md. 455, 459, 231 A.2d 674, 676 (1967) (court allowed
evidence submitted in nature of oral testimony during summary judgment procedure
but not transcribed or anywhere recorded). See generally 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 2, 56.11[1.-61, .11[8].
148. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
3212.05, at 32-127 (M. Waxner rev. 1969).
149. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
150. MD. R.P. 610(a)(3).
[VOL. 38
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN MARYLAND
cannot "present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposi-
tion." 151 The affidavit should explain which facts cannot be rebutted,
the full reason for this inability, and the steps which the party has
taken or intends to take to obtain this information.
152
In response to an affidavit filed pursuant to rule 610(d)(2), the
trial court may deny the summary judgment motion without
prejudice to its later renewal, grant a continuance to permit
affidavits, depositions, or further discovery to be developed, or
"make such other order as justice may require.1 1 53 Although the
rules do not specify a time for filing such an affidavit, it is logically
analogous to that of an opposing affidavit and should be filed "at or
before the time of the hearing."1 5 4 The trial court has much
discretion in determining whether to grant a continuance of the
summary judgment hearing,'5 5 and it should weigh both the
timeliness of the motion 5 6 and the reasonableness of the opposing
party's need for delay in reaching its decision.'5 7
Few Maryland cases have dealt with rule 610(d)(2), but, because
it is nearly identical to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), the
federal cases should provide substantial guidance to future Mary-
land courts.158 Professors Wright and Miller state that the federal
151. MD. R.P. 610(d)(2). See Brown v. Suburban Cadillac, Inc., 260 Md. 251, 257,
272 A.2d 42, 45 (1971).
152. The Court of Appeals observed:
A person who claims the existence of a document which is material to his
opposition to a motion for summary judgment, but which document is not in
his possession ... should explain in his affidavit why he cannot produce it,
specifically stating his reasons, and thereby enlist the aid of the court under
Rule 610 d 2. He cannot merely allude to its existence, and without more, hope
to raise the specter of dispute over a material fact which would defeat the
motion for summary judgment under Maryland Rule 610 d 1.
Brown v. Suburban Cadillac, Inc., 260 Md. 251, 256-57, 272 A.2d 42, 45 (1971).
153. MD. R.P. 610(d)(2).
154. MD. R.P. 610(a)(3).
155. See Mullan Contracting Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 220 Md.
248, 258, 151 A.2d 906, 912 (1959).
156. It is not an abuse of discretion for a trial judge to refuse a request for a
continuance in order to obtain further discovery for a summary judgment proceeding
when the request was made in the midst of argument on the motion. See Selected
Risks Ins. Co. v. Willis, 266 Md. 674, 678, 296 A.2d 424, 426 (1972).
157. While the presence of unanswered interrogatories having a bearing on the
summary judgment proceeding could provide a legitimate basis for postponement, the
Court of Appeals held that a trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying a
continuance under this rule when a party had three and one-third months to
commence discovery which might be used to thwart summary judgment and did
nothing. See Basiliko v. Royal Nat'l Bank, 263 Md. 545, 548, 284 A.2d 227, 228 (1971).
158. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
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cases have applied the rule "with a spirit of liberality."' 5 9 When a
party has proceeded diligently but has failed to meet all the
technical requirements of the rule, he should be given the rule's
protection.160 This liberality is particularly apt when the party
seeking to invoke the rule is either incarcerated or proceeding pro
se.16I
CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
If two or more opposing parties to an action feel entitled to
summary judgment, each may file such a motion. 6 2 These are
commonly termed cross-motions for summary judgment. Typically,
each party will agree that there exists no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and each will assert opposing issues of law. If, indeed,
no factual dispute exists and only a question of law remains to be
resolved, one of the motions will generally be granted and the other
denied, promptly and efficiently disposing of the case.
Because the parties are not the final arbiters of whether a
factual dispute exists, however, cross-motions for summary judg-
ment do not necessarily result in the court granting one motion and
denying the other. 16 3 Even though the parties agree that there is no
factual dispute, the court may find otherwise. In addition, the issues
posed by the cross-motions may differ. A party's theory might not
arise out of the same factual base as his opponent's. Thus, factual
issues may remain unresolved in either or both parties' cross-
motions. A variation that would require the denial of both motions
occurs when one party establishes that there is no factual dispute
but his legal claim is incorrect, while the other party may not be able
to establish the absence of a factual conflict with respect to his legal
issue. Cross-motions could also merely result in the granting of
partial summary judgment.16 4
The rules permit a party moving for summary judgment to
concede facts merely for the purpose of that motion. If the motion is
denied, these facts could later be contested at trial.165 Nevertheless, it
159. 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 2740, at 724. See 6 pt. 2 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, 56.24, at 56-1425 to -1426.
160. See 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, §2740, at 724-26.
161. E.g., Bracey v. Herringa, 466 F.2d 702, 703 (7th Cir. 1972); Hudson v. Hardy,
412 F.2d 1091, 1094-95 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
162. MD. R.P. 610(a)(1).
163. MD. R.P. 610(dX1).
164. See text accompanying notes 181 to 185 infra.
165. MD. R.P. 610(dX4).
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appears that these concessions would not carry over and help the
opposing party's cross-motion. 166
Finally, the rules permit the trial court, "where appropriate," to
grant summary judgment for a party opposing the motion even if
that party has not filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. 167
Because there would generally be a lack of adequate notice, it would
probably be inappropriate for the court to grant such a sua sponte
cross-motion regarding issues not raised by the moving party's
motion. 168
BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
The party moving for summary judgment has the dual burden of
establishing to the court's satisfaction that there exists "no genuine
dispute as to any material fact" and that "he is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law."' 16 9 The failure of the moving party to establish
either prong of this twofold test should result in the denial of the
motion. 70 If any doubts arise as to whether a genuine factual
dispute exists or whether the case is otherwise ripe for summary
judgment, such doubts must be resolved against the moving party.
Therefore, if the facts are susceptible to more than one inference,
"the inferences must be drawn in the light most favorable to the
person against whom the motion is made ... and in the light least
favorable to the movant ... ,"171 An appellate court reviewing the
grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment must, of course,
also draw inferences in this fashion. 72 Similarly, the facts set forth
166. See, e.g., M. Snower & Co. v. United States, 140 F.2d 367, 369-70 (7th Cir.
1944). See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, §2720, at 462-64.
167. MD. R.P. 610(dXl).
168. Cf. Concord Co. v. Matherly, 216 Md. 453, 460, 140 A.2d 900, 903-04 (1958)
(cross-motion for summary judgment filed by appellees on day of hearing on
appellant's prior summary judgment motion limited to single issue was mistakenly
considered at same time by chancellor who rendered judgment for appellees on all
issues;- court held judgment should have been limited to single issue raised by
appellant, stating in dictum that chancellor could have rendered judgment in favor of
appellees on all issues even if they had not made cross-motion if appellant's motion
had not been limited to a single issue).
169. MD. R.P. 610(aX1).
170. If the moving party does not establish a factual dispute but the court
concludes that his opponent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, it may grant
summary judgment for the opponent. MD. R.P. 610(dXl).
171. Lipscomb v. Hess, 255 Md. 109, 118, 257 A.2d 178, 183 (1969). See Washington
Homes, Inc. v. Interstate Land Dev. Co., 281 Md. 712, 717-18, 382 A.2d 555, 557-58
(1978).
172. Washington Homes, Inc. v. Interstate Land Dev. Co., 281 Md. 712, 717-18, 382
A.2d 555, 557-58 (1978).
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by the opposing party, if supported by a proper affidavit, 173 are
presumed to be true. Thus, the opposing party's affiants are
presumed to be credible witnesses. Conversely, if the moving party's
affiants' statements raise issues of credibility,174 they must be
resolved in favor of the opposing party, and summary judgment
generally will be denied. The jury will then become the trier of
credibility.
Although the general rule, as illustrated above, is that
presumptions operate against the party seeking summary judgment,
there is one significant exception. If an opposing party fails to file
countering affidavits challenging the moving party's factual
statements when required by rule 610(a)(3), the moving party's
factual statement, if credible, will be presumed to be true.175 This
means that although the moving party carries the initial burden of
establishing the essence of a genuine factual dispute, he can
discharge this burden and shift it to the opposing party by filing
credible relevant affidavits. The burden is then on the opposing
party to counter with opposing affidavits or other documents to
undermine the moving party's claim. 7 6 Although no Maryland court
has used this characterization, these presumptions, as a whole,
173. The opponent's affidavit will be ineffective unless it meets certain minimum
requirements. For example, it must show with some precision that there is a genuine
dispute as to a material fact and not merely respond in a vague and indefinite
fashion. E.g., Sherman v. American Bankers Life Assur. Co., 264 Md. 239, 243, 285
A.2d 652, 654 (1972). The minimum standards of sufficiency are discussed at pp.
204-07 supra.
174. Unless the moving party's affidavits are not credible on their face, the burden
typically will be on the opposing party to explain why the movant's affiants should
not be believed. The opposing party has no right to avoid summary judgment on the
mere hope that these witnesses may falter at trial; instead, he must establish a reason
why this would happen. See 6 pt. 2 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2,
$ 56.15[4], at 56-524 to -525. To create a triable issue, it might be shown, for example,
that the affiant has an interest in the subject matter of the litigation, Sartor v.
Arkansas Natural Gas Co., 321 U.S. 620 (1944), that he was not in a position to
observe the facts accurately, or that there exist other grounds to impeach the content
of his affidavit statement. Professor Moore suggests that an opponent should not get
to trial on such credibility issues if, for example, the movant's evidence does not lend
itself to cross-examination, if it was based on documentary evidence, or if the
opponent has failed to avail himself of tests of the affiant's credibility such as
depositions or other discovery devices. 6 pt. 2 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note
2, 1 56.15[4], at 56-512 to -513.
175. See text accompanying note 96 supra.
176. As the Court of Appeals observed: "Where .. . pleadings, exhibits and
affidavits of the moving party set forth sufficient competent evidence to entitle him to
summary judgment, it is incumbent upon the opposing party to present such evidence
as will give rise to a triable issue of a material fact." Fishman Constr. Co. v. Hansen,
238 Md. 418, 422, 209 A.2d 605, 608 (1965). See Marshall v. Woods, 260 Md. 15, 20, 271
A.2d 357, 360 (1970).
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indicate that the trial court should carefully scrutinize the moving
party's papers while treating those of the opposing party with
indulgence. 177
THE COURT'S OPTIONS IN RULING ON THE MOTION
A motion for summary judgment should be granted "if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law."'178 The granting of the motion, however, "does not
itself constitute the entry of final judgment.' 1 79 That final step must
be accomplished as a follow-up procedure pursuant to the rules
governing entry of judgment. 8 Aside from granting or denying a
summary judgment motion outright, it can also be resolved in
several other ways - partial summary judgment, an order limiting
the issues, or summary judgment for the opposing party.
Partial Summary Judgment
If it appears that no genuine factual dispute as to a part of a
claim or defense exists, partial summary judgment can be entered on
that issue or issues. 18' The terminology "partial summary judgment"
is somewhat misleading. Because the full case has not yet been
resolved, the entry of a final judgment would be premature. This
remedy might be more properly labeled a "partial summary
adjudication."'' 8 2 The court has broad discretion in rendering a
partial resolution of the issues: it may render judgment "upon such
terms as it thinks fit."'81 3 If the court grants a partial summary
judgment, the case would then proceed to the resolution of the
remaining issues. If the full case had originally been within the
court's jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction even though the partial
resolution has reduced the amount in controversy to a level below
the trial court's jurisdictional amount. 84 If either the resolved or
177. E.g., Wittlin v. Giacalone, 154 F.2d 20, 22 (D.C. Cir. 1946); 6 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 2, 56.15[3], at 56-469 to -472. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 157-61 (1970).
178. MD. R.P. 610(d)(1).
179. Felger v. Nichols, 30 Md. App. 278, 279, 352 A.2d 330, 331 (1976).
180. See MD. R.P. 641, 671 (law and equity judgments respectively).
181. MD. R.P. 610(d)(1) & (3). See Concord Co. v. Matherly, 216 Md. 453, 459-60, 140
A.2d 900, 903-04 (1958). Rule 610(d)(1) specifically permits summary judgment with
respect to liability even though the proper amount of damages remains in dispute.
182. See 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 2737, at 681.
183. MD. R.P. 610(d)(3).
184. Id.
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unresolved portions of the case concerns amounts below the court's
jurisdictional limit, a separate judgment for this amount recoverable
in the district court may be entered, or the court may await the
outcome of the disputed portions and permit execution on the
combined judgment within its jurisdiction.'8 5
Order Limiting Issues
When a summary judgment hearing fails to resolve all of the
issues in the case, the court at that point should, "if practicable,"
render an order "specifying the facts that appear without substan-
tial controversy" and those that are "actually and in good faith
controverted.' 1 6 This order by the court, which would closely
resemble a pretrial order under rule 504(c), 187 is mandatory if at all
practicable. The facts that "appear without substantial controversy"
are then deemed established, and the trial of the disputed portions of
the case then proceeds "as justice may require."' 88
Summary Judgment for Opponent
If it appears at the hearing that summary judgment should be
rendered in favor of the party opposing the motion, the court may
render summary judgment for that party "even though he has not
filed a cross-motion for summary judgment."' 8 9 Typically, this
situation occurs when the court is convinced that no genuine dispute
exists but that the legal issues should be resolved against the
movant and in favor of the opposing party. This appears to be the
only situation in which summary judgment can routinely be granted
without the benefiting party requesting it first. 90
185. Id. See also MD. R.P. 653.
186. MD. R.P. 610(d)(4). The factual posture of the case is to be determined by the
court "by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating
counsel." Id.
187. MD. R.P. 540(c) provides:
The court may make an order which recites the action taken at the
conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements
made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits the
issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of
counsel. Such order may thereafter be modified, either before or during the
trial, as justice may require.
188. MD. R.P. 610(d)(4).
189. MD. R.P. 610(d)(1).
190. See text accompanying note 167 supra.
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MOTION OR AFFIDAVIT MADE IN BAD FAITH
Rule 610(e) contains a provision intended to penalize a party
who abuses summary judgment procedures. If a motion or affidavit
is "presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay," the
offending party can be ordered to pay to any other party "the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the motion or
affidavit caused him to incur, including reasonable attorneys'
fees."'191 This provision is broader than its federal counterpart 92 in
that the motion itself, not just its supporting or opposing affidavits,
is included as a basis for the award,193 and it should therefore give
the Maryland courts more flexibility when invoking this remedy.
Furthermore, it seems clear that rule 610(e) is broad enough to
include affidavits filed pursuant to rule 610(d) in which an opposing
party states reasons for not being able to present facts sufficient to
justify its opposition.
Unlike federal rule 56(g), however, rule 610 does not specifically
permit the court to hold either the offending party or his attorney in
contempt on the basis of a motion or affidavit tendered in bad faith.
The rule also does not allow the court to order offending attorneys,
rather than their clients, to pay the expenses incurred due to their
bad faith. Thus, it is solely the offending party who bears the brunt
of this penalty. Although rule 610's apparently intentional omission
of a contempt remedy indicates that this extreme sanction is not
favored, the court's inherent power to invoke the contempt citation to
preserve its orderly functioning' 94 should, in extraordinary situa-
tions, supply the legal basis for a contempt order against either the
party or his attorney. While no reported Maryland cases have yet
applied rule 610(e), its similarity to the federal rule and the several
federal cases that have imposed sanctions for bad faith pursuant to
that rule should offer guidance to the courts regarding appropriate
occasions for implementing the Maryland rule and the types of costs
to be awarded.' 95
191. MD. R.P. 610(e).
192. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(g). See 6 pt. 2 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2,
56.25.
193. Because affidavits need not always be filed in support of a summary
judgment motion, see pp. 202-10 supra, a narrower rule might fail to provide
adequate sanctions for abuses of summary judgment procedures.
194. See Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 121, 136 A. 312, 315 (1927); Muskus v. State,
14 Md. App. 348, 358-59, 286 A.2d 783, 788 (1972).
195. See, e.g., Alart Assocs., Inc. v. Aptaker, 279 F. Supp. 268, 270 (S.D.N.Y.),
appeal dismissed, 402 F.2d 779 (2d Cir. 1968); Clark v. Hancock, 45 F.R.D. 512, 514-15
(S.D. Ga. 1968).
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PARTICULAR CASES
Although earlier forms of summary judgment procedures were
traditionally limited to particular categories of cases,196 there is
nothing in the present Maryland rule, the case law, or the logic of
the summary judgment process that would prevent its application to
any particular type of cause of action. The significant inquiry is not
whether the action is based on contract or tort but, regardless of its
legal label, whether there is a genuine dispute as to the material
facts of the case. Because in practice certain types of cases pose
factual disputes that can rarely be resolved without a fact-finding
inquiry, however, it may be that summary judgment frequently
cannot be invoked in such situations. 197
Antitrust and tort cases are two types of cases that often involve
contested versions of the facts. The Maryland Court of Appeals has
warned that "[u]sually it is neither advisable nor practicable to enter
a summary judgment in a tort action."'198 It has, however, approved
the granting of summary judgment in tort cases in which all
conditions of the rule were met, including, ironically, the case
espousing the aforementioned caveat.199 Because of the seriousness
and frequent complexity of the issues posed by constitutional
questions, the need for a full and complete factual hearing often
precludes summary judgment in constitutional cases. In Lawrence v.
State Department of Health,2°° for example, the Court of Appeals
upheld the denial of summary judgment and warned that "[c]onstitu-
tional issues are generally not to be decided on mere conclusions of
the pleadings. ' 20 ' When the circumstances allow, however, summary
judgment is appropriate in these cases as well.20 2 Cases that
196. See pp. 189-93 supra.
197. For a brief study of summary judgment in various types of cases on appeal
before the Fourth Circuit, see Guiher, Summary Judgment - Tactical Problem of the
Trial Lawyer, 48 U. VA. L. REv. 1263 (1962).
198. Driver v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 247 Md. 75, 79, 230 A.2d 321, 324 (1967).
See 4 J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, supra note 148, 3212.03, at 32-123 to
-126.
199. Driver v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 247 Md. 75, 230 A.2d 321 (1967). Accord
Evans v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 224 Md. 234, 167 A.2d 591 (1961). See Burke v.
Williams, 244 Md. 154, 158, 223 A.2d 187, 189 (1966) (dictum) ("In [tort] cases such as
this one, where the facts are not in dispute and the plaintiff intentionally and
voluntarily exposed himself to a known danger, we have sustained the granting of
summary judgment .. ").
200. 247 Md. 367, 231 A.2d 46 (1967).
201. Id. at 373, 231 A.2d at 49.
202. E.g., Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n v. Buckley, 197 Md. 203, 78
A.2d 638 (1951). See generally 6 pt. 2 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2,
56.17[11.
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primarily raise issues of fraud or intent are also generally ill suited
for summary judgment due to the need for greater than usual factual
development, 2 3 but when there is no genuine issue of material fact,
summary judgment may be appropriate. 20 4 In addition, a summary
judgment motion can readily serve as a means by which a defendant
may claim that the plaintiff's suit must be dismissed because of the
running of the statute of limitations. Because a statute of limitations
defense generally cannot be raised at law in Maryland by a
demurrer, 20 5 summary judgment provides a prompt mechanism for
resolving this issue if no dispute exists as to the relevant facts.20
6
Trial courts should heed the words of Mr. Justice Jackson in the
Supreme Court's Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co. 20 7 decision when
trying to apply summary judgment procedures to a legally and
factually complicated case:
We do not hold that in the form the controversy took in the
District Court that tribunal lacked power or justification for
applying the summary judgment procedure. But summary
procedures, however salutary where issues are clear-cut and
simple, present a treacherous record for deciding issues of far-
flung import, on which this Court should draw inferences with
caution from complicated courses of legislation, contracting and
practice.
We consider it the part of good judicial administration to
withhold decision of the ultimate questions involved in this case
until this or another record shall present a more solid basis of
findings based on litigation or on a comprehensive statement of
agreed facts. While we might be able, on the present record, to
reach a conclusion that would decide the case, it might well be
found later to be lacking in the thoroughness that should
precede judgment of this importance and which it is the purpose
of the judicial process to provide. 20 8
TACTICAL USE OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The summary judgment procedure is neutral on its face, but like
any procedure that provides a direct route to a judgment granting
affirmative relief, it tends to favor the party who seeks a change in
203. See 6 pt. 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, 56.17[27], .17[41. -1].
204. Id. at 56-869 to -871, -930 to -932.
205. See Hoover v. Williamson, 236 Md. 250, 255-56, 203 A.2d 861, 864 (1964).
206. E.g., Jordan v. Morgan, 252 Md. 122, 249 A.2d 124 (1969); MacBride v. Gulbro,
247 Md. 727, 234 A.2d 586 (1967).
207. 334 U.S. 249 (1948).
208. Id. at 256-57.
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the status quo. Summary judgment was conceived as a plaintiffs
offensive weapon 209 and in practice remains primarily a plaintiffs
remedy except in the less frequent situations concerning counter-
claims, cross-claims, and third-party claims. The procedure's major
attraction is that if properly invoked, it should promptly resolve the
parties' dispute without the expenditure of a great deal of time and
money. Judicial determinations based on affidavits are much more
efficient than those founded on the presentation of witnesses at trial.
Aside from these more obvious functions, the procedure provides
its initiator with several other tactical advantages. In many cases a
plaintiff might be able to tailor his claims so as to obtain a summary
judgment more readily. If he has multiple legal grounds for the same
claim, he could move for summary judgment based upon those not
posing factual issues, thereby avoiding the need for a trial on the
factually disputed grounds.. Also, it is generally within a party's
control to frame his claims so as to avoid factual issues or perhaps
even to concede a claim in order to avoid the necessity of a factual
hearing to resolve it. Because the plaintiff controls the limits of his
claims, he can more readily maneuver to attain a summary
judgment posture. This ability to play the dominant role in
structuring a case can lead to several benefits for a plaintiff. In
many instances an attorney may conclude that his case will be
damaged by a trial. Recitation of the facts of the case through the
austere and relatively emotionless medium of affidavits might be
preferred to the more vivid picture painted by in-court testimony.
Faced with the prospect of a trial, counsel might even concede minor
issues in order to guarantee the absence of a factual dispute and
thereby foreclose trial through the use of summary judgment.
A related strategy derives its value from the unpredictability of
trial testimony. An affidavit prepared for the affiant by an attorney
can be carefully worded. It eliminates the risks of the witness'
uncertain choice of words or a change of mind at trial. Thus, an
eloquently written affidavit is not only the more desirable medium,
but it also eliminates the element of surprise which might aid an
opponent with a weak case.
Summary judgment can also be used to induce a prompt
settlement in a case. The filing of a summary judgment motion
immediately puts the opponent at risk of losing the case. Pressing
for resolution of the issue in this way will generally force an
opponent to evaluate carefully the strength of his case. He must fully
assess the validity of the proponent's legal issues, as well as weigh
209. See pp. 189-93 supra.
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his ability to counter the factual proffers with affidavits of his own.
This assessment of the probability of success should set the stage for
a reasonable compromise position. Thus, a plaintiff who can
persuasively present his claim as having no factual dispute may
obtain a quick settlement through the effective use of summary
judgment.
Summary judgment also has certain disadvantages for the
plaintiff. A premature invocation of summary judgment, resulting in
denial due to the existence of a factual dispute, could waste valuable
attorney time and client money.2 10 In a case in which the existence of
a factual dispute presents a close question, the better strategy might
be for counsel to forego the easy shortcuts to a quick victory in favor
of the greater guarantee of victory after trial. Frequently, attorneys
have tried to avoid trial by the summary judgment procedure only to
have an appellate court find that a factual dispute existed and order
a remand.211 If a party is too impatient in invoking summary
procedures, the ensuing appeal might cost more time and money
than it could possibly have saved. Furthermore, this tactic, if
unsuccessful, might procedurally prejudice the case as well as
disappoint the client.21 2
Typically, the defendant will have numerous tactical reasons for
wanting to avoid the summary judgment procedure. Because time
and the status quo are most often on his side, the speed of summary
judgment tends to provoke resistance. If a defendant is interested in
delay, he must provoke a factual dispute, thereby necessitating a
trial. If he has an emotional case, he will probably want the full
force of his story conveyed by live witnesses. If he has a weak case,
his only hope of success may be linked to the whims of the jury. On
the other hand, an attorney with confidence in his case may be
unwilling to have the truth determined by the less perfect device of
an affidavit. It may be that his case would benefit from the
personalities of his live witnesses or that his opponent's position
would crumble under cross-examination, the truth-assuring mecha-
nism not incorporated into the summary judgment procedure.
The complexity of summary judgment procedures might also
lead a cautious or inexperienced counsel opposing summary
judgment to misinterpret the rule. As has been demonstrated,
Maryland's rule poses many perils for the unwary. An attorney
210. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946); 4 J. WEISTEIN, H. KORN &
A. MILLER, supra note 148, 3212.03, at 32-123; Guiher, supra note 197, at 1266.
211. See, e.g., Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
212. See Guiher, supra note 197, at 1268-70.
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might file a deficient countering affidavit or, even worse, none at all.
If his countering witness is unavailable or if the facts underlying the
potential dispute are within the movant's knowledge or control,
opposing counsel may not react appropriately. A vague motion and
affidavit or one seemingly deficient might lull the opposing counsel
into thinking that a strong countering affidavit is unnecessary.
Because the opposing party generally has nothing to win and much
to lose by summary judgment, these pitfalls pose a substantial risk.
CONCLUSION
The summary judgment procedure, like any procedural device,
bestows its bounties upon different parties at different times and,
like any rule, is susceptible to abuse. Nevertheless, if its advantages
were appreciated by the bar and uniformly applied by the bench, it
would promote the interests of the parties and judiciary alike in their
mutual pursuit of justice and the efficient resolution of cases.
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN MARYLAND
APPENDIX
Maryland Rule of Procedure 610. Summary Judgment.
a. Motion for.
1. When and by Whom Made.
In an action, a party asserting a claim, whether an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or a party
against whom a claim is asserted, may at any time make a motion
for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part of the
claim on the ground that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
2. Effect on Time for Pleading.
A motion for summary judgment does not affect the time for
pleading unless the court orders otherwise.
3. Use of Affidavits.
The motion must be supported by affidavit when filed with the
pleading asserting the claim or before the adverse party has filed his
initial pleading to it; otherwise the motion may be made with or
without supporting affidavits. Unless the court shall otherwise order
for good cause shown, where the motion is required to be supported
by affidavit and the opposing party desires to controvert any
statement of fact therein, he must file an affidavit or deposition in.
support of his answer to the motion. Such affidavit or deposition
shall be filed before or at the time of filing his initial pleading unless
the time for filing is extended pursuant to section a of Rule 309. The
failure to file such opposing affidavit or deposition shall constitute
an admission for purposes of the motion of all statements of fact in
the affidavit of the moving party, but shall not constitute an
admission that such motion or affidavit is legally sufficient. In all
other cases the adverse party may file an opposing affidavit at or
before the time of the hearing.
4. In Lieu of Hearing on Bill and Answer.
Cases formerly heard on bill and answer may be heard under
this Rule.
b. Form of Affidavit - Further Evidence.
Supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in
evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent
to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn, or certified or
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photostatic copies of all material papers or parts thereof referred to
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or filed therewith or their
absence satisfactorily explained. The court may permit affidavits to
be supplemented or opposed by depositions or by further affidavits.
c. Time of Hearings.
1. Motion Before Initial Pleading to Claim.
Where a claimant files the motion with his pleading asserting
the claim, or thereafter but before the adverse party has filed his
initial pleading to it, the motion, upon not less than fifteen days'
notice by either party, may be heard at any time after the expiration
of fifteen days after the return day in the action. Every such motion
shall be accompanied by a notice to the adverse party (1) stating the
time at or after which the motion may be heard, and (2) warning him
that upon his failure to plead within the time allowed by law or rule
of court, judgment will be entered against him.
2. Motion After Initial Pleading to Claim.
Where a motion is filed after the adverse party has filed his
initial pleading to such claim, the motion, upon not less than ten
days' notice by either party, may be heard at any time. The motion
shall be accompanied by a notice stating the time at or after which it
may be heard.
3. Absence of Defense.
After motion and notice and upon failure of the adverse party to
plead to the claim within the time allowed by law or rule of court the
court may, at any time thereafter, without hearing and without
further notice to the adverse party, enter a judgment in conformity
with section d of this Rule.
d. Proceedings on Motion.
1. Motion Granted.
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character,
may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine dispute as to the amount of damages. Where appropriate,
the court on the hearing may render judgment for the opposing party
even though he has not filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.
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2. Affidavit of Defense Not Available.
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the
motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts
essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit
affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be
had or may make such other order as justice may require.
3. Part of Claim - No Genuine Issue.
If at the hearing it appears that there is no genuine dispute as to
part of the claim or as to the defense to part of the claim, the court in
its discretion may render judgment forthwith as to that part, upon
such terms as it thinks fit. In such case, the action shall proceed on
the disputed part of the claim, and the court shall retain jurisdiction
of the action, even though the disputed part is below its jurisdic-
tional amount, if the original claim was within its jurisdiction. If the
summary judgment or judgment on the disputed portion is below the
jurisdiction of the court, Rule 653 (Verdict Below Jurisdictional
Amount) shall apply, except that execution on the combined
judgments may issue from the court entering them, if their sum is
within its jursidction.
4. Order Limiting Issues.
If on the motion judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or
for all the relief asked and a trial is necessary, a party shall not be
limited at the trial to the facts stated in his affidavit. But in such
case, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel
shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in
good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order\specifying
the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in the
controversy, and direct such further proceedings in the action as
justice may require. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified
shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted
accordingly.
5. Amendment Not Limited.
This Rule shall not limit or affect amendment of the pleadings at
any stage of the proceedings.
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e. Bad Faith.
Should it appear to the satisfaction of the court at any time that
any motion or affidavit presented pursuant to this Rule is presented
in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the offending party to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the motion or
affidavit caused him to incur, including reasonable attorneys' fees.
